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III

Cosmopolitanism

Simon Jackman and Lynn Vavreck

I am a citizen of the world.
—*Diogenes the Cynic, 412 B.C.*

ON APRIL 14, 2008, with Barack Obama only eight points behind her in the polls and the Pennsylvania Democratic primary only days away, Hillary Clinton downed a shot of whiskey and a beer at a campaign stop in Indiana. She was appealing to working class Americans, those “hard-working” Americans she claimed could not bring themselves to vote for the effete, well-educated Barack Obama.¹

Clinton was capitalizing on revelations of remarks made by Obama at a closed-press fundraising event in liberal San Francisco. Obama said:

You go into these small towns in Pennsylvania and, like a lot of small towns in the Midwest, the jobs have been gone now for 25 years and nothing’s replaced them. And it’s not surprising, then, they get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations.²

Pennsylvania and the American Midwest versus the California coast—in America, geography and politics are related. But how? America is the third largest country in the world in terms of both square kilometers and population. Americans exhibit tremendous cultural diversity. Some of us hunt; some of us are vegetarian. Some of us believe that the Bible is the literal word of God; some of us are atheists. The social spaces we inhabit vary tremendously in terms of their extent and character. For some of us, social space is largely local, centered on social networks and institutions in one’s neighborhood. For others, social spaces span the nation and the globe, encompassing people and cultures who are different from those in one’s physical locale. These differences go a long way toward defining us socially, culturally, and spatially.

In this chapter, we explore the political implications of these differences. The distinction between a “local” or “global” orientation systematically affects political behavior both within and across parties. Borrowing a concept from 1950s sociology—but operationalizing it differently—we

demonstrate that “cosmopolitanism” affects vote choice and is not well measured by typical demographic or attitudinal controls we routinely include in vote models. Further, we show that cosmopolitanism is not accounted for by mainstay geographic indicators such as the regional marker for South or non-South. Cosmopolitanism is a mix of attributes, local environment, and opportunity, and the means of taking advantage of those opportunities. But we measure it here through a series of behaviors (or self-reports of behaviors) that indicate the presence or absence of a cosmopolitan orientation.

What Is Cosmopolitanism?

Cosmopolitanism has its roots in ancient political thought. But contemporary, social-scientific treatments of cosmopolitanism begin with the seminal work of the sociologist Robert Merton. In operationalizing the concept, Merton³ identified two types of community leaders, “cosmopolitans” and “locals.” Cosmopolitans (or “cosmopolites” as they are sometimes called) are more attentive to the world than locals, who tend to be oriented toward the local community. Both groups have distinct bases of power, influence, and leadership. For instance, locals have interpersonal relationships, developed over time within their communities, which serve as the basis of their political power and leadership; cosmopolites have knowledge and skills acquired from (and valuable within) a broader social space, which in turn generate prestige, wealth, and, in turn, power.⁴ This is an important point. Both groups are influential, but for different reasons, and the local-cosmopolitan distinction is not intended to be normative or pejorative.

For a brief period, several influential scholars investigated cosmopolitanism, albeit from varying theoretical perspectives and operationalizations. Katz and Lazarsfeld⁵ operationalized the concept through news orientations; Gouldner⁶ classified employees as cosmopolitans or locals depending on their loyalty to the company, commitment to developing their specialization, and whether their primary reference group was interior to the company or exterior to it; Abrahamson⁷ used the construct to study geographic mobility; Filley and Grimes⁸ used cosmopolitanism to study power.

In 1967, Kent Jennings showed that cosmopolitanism was markedly related to political behavior. Jennings⁹ found that cosmopolitanism—as measured in a national sample of twelfth graders—was related to knowledge and discourse about larger political domains, interest in public affairs, evaluations of politics at multiple levels, and tolerance of political diversity. Compared to their parents, teenagers in the mid-1960s were

1 more cosmopolitan. Jennings concluded that this was likely due to both
2 generation and life-cycle effects. Jennings pointed out that political scien-
3 tists have a tendency to forget that citizens interact with multiple systems
4 of government, some local and some as broad as national. He argues that:

5 There is a tendency in political studies to focus on one system at a time, as in
6 community studies or in national participation studies. In so doing, some of
7 the richness and complexity of how man relates to his political environment
8 is sacrificed.
9

10 Ironically, it was Jennings's Michigan colleagues Campbell, Converse,
11 Miller, and Stokes who started the American National Election Studies
12 (ANES), utilizing the national probability sample as a means of learn-
13 ing about political behavior. As the Michigan studies gained momentum,
14 the study of local politics and local communities became rare. Cosmo-
15 politanism faded from the research agenda both in political science and
16 sociology.

17 Other disciplines, however, leveraged the concept in extremely impor-
18 tant ways throughout the years. Most notably, cosmopolitanism has an
19 extremely long lineage in political theory and philosophy, with an em-
20 phasis on many of the same facets of the concept that we attempt to
21 operationalize here—e.g., a respect for “the other,” a tolerance for things
22 and people who are different, and the notion that morality is not rooted
23 locally, but globally. Kwame Anthony Appiah¹⁰ makes a compelling argu-
24 ment about morality and cosmopolitanism, and we adopt several of his
25 ideas as we operationalize the concept. In addition, diplomatic and foreign
26 policy specialists use the concept to explain and predict nationalism, ethnic
27 conflict, tyranny, emancipation, and other important phenomena.¹¹

28 Yet, for a concept that has been so widely used across disciplines,
29 cosmopolitanism is underelaborated theoretically, to say nothing of our
30 dearth of understanding as to its empirical content. There is a widely
31 shared scholarly consensus that cosmopolitanism is largely driven by ex-
32 perience: how one relates to local community, the nature of work, how
33 people treat their neighbors (especially if they are different). But another
34 facet seems attitudinal: an openness to experience other cultures or cus-
35 toms and a belief that there is something to be gained from a connection
36 to people and places beyond the local community. These dimensions re-
37 turn us to Merton's¹² original description of the concept: parochial versus
38 ecumenical orientations and their behavioral manifestations.

39 We explore the local-cosmopolitan distinction in the pages to come,
40 offering a new operationalization of the concept, based on self-reports
41 of reasonably common behaviors: playing sports, traveling, and eating.
42 For instance, we conjecture that those who report participating in locally
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organized, community-oriented sports, like softball, or who have not experienced foods different from their own nor traveled far from home are more likely to be one of Merton's "locals." At the other end of the dimension are people who report travel to places like South Africa or Asia, people who report eating ethnic foods, and people whose conception of community is much more broad. These people experience others who are different from them—and like Appiah,¹³ we argue that this experience is critical.

We investigate the effect of cosmopolitanism on political behavior. The 2008 presidential election provides a unique opportunity for this investigation, because of Obama's inherent difference. Voters in this contest were faced with a choice between mainstay partisan regulars (Clinton and McCain) and a man about whom everything was different—Barack Obama. We further believe that enthusiasm for or anxiety toward Obama among white voters is about more than Obama's race (although we have shown elsewhere¹⁴ that attitudes about race certainly played a critical role in these contests). Specifically, we suspect that people with low levels of cosmopolitanism (Merton's "locals") should be less likely to vote for Obama, all else equal, since they have less appetite for things that are different from the environment with which they are locally familiar.

Appiah¹⁵ writes of two strands in cosmopolitanism:

One is the idea that we have obligations to others, obligations that stretch beyond those to whom we are related by the ties of kith and kind, or even the more formal ties of a shared citizenship. The other is that we take seriously the value not just of human life, but of particular human lives . . . people are different, the cosmopolitan knows, and there is much to learn from our differences. There will be times when these two strands—universal concern and respect for legitimate difference—clash. There's a sense in which cosmopolitanism is the name not of the solution but of the challenge.

In the pages that follow, we argue that in 2008, voters in the U.S. presidential election and the Democratic primary were challenged by the limits of their cosmopolitanism—or perhaps we should say the strength of their "local" ties.

Operationalization and Data

We use data from a 2007–2008 panel study of registered voters. In 2008, we were the principal investigators (PIs) of the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP),¹⁶ in which we investigated attitudes about the candidates, issues, race, and other political topics. CCAP was conducted

1 in six waves between December of 2007 and November of 2008. The
 2 primary election waves, which were conducted in December (2007),
 3 January, and March, were followed by a post-primary survey in September.
 4 The September wave also doubled as the first general election wave,
 5 which was followed by another interview in October and a post-election
 6 followup in November. A total of 10,486 respondents were impaneled
 7 across each of these six waves, and we use these data in the analyses that
 8 follow.

9 CCAP was administered online by YouGov/Polimetrix, Inc., a survey
 10 research firm in Palo Alto, California. The project was a joint venture of
 11 27 research teams around the world. For details on the structure of the
 12 cooperative projects see Vavreck and Rivers.¹⁷ CCAP is designed to be
 13 representative of registered voters. Details on the construction of the sample
 14 and comparisons with other election studies can be found in Jackman
 15 and Vavreck.¹⁸ For this paper, we use data from the “Common Content”
 16 portion of CCAP, containing 20,000 respondents.¹⁹

17 We operationalize cosmopolitanism with indicators fielded in the Sep-
 18 tember 2008 wave of the study, after the party nominees are known and
 19 after each of the nominating conventions. The cosmopolitanism items
 20 ask respondents to report on their past behavior about a variety of top-
 21 ics, including travel, hobbies, and food via seven binary response items.
 22 Respondents read the following stem:

23 We are interested in the kinds of things people do for recreation. Tell us a little
 24 bit about yourself. In the last 10 years, have you . . .

25
 26 The following list of seven items was then asked. Respondents could
 27 answer “Yes, I have done this” or “No, I have not done this” to these
 28 questions. Respondents were also free to skip any or all of these items:

- 29 1. Played softball on an organized team?
- 30 2. Gone hunting?
- 31 3. Been to Europe or Australia?
- 32 4. Traveled to Canada or Mexico?
- 33 5. Visited Asia, Africa, or South America?
- 34 6. Gone to an Indian restaurant?
- 35 7. Had Japanese food?

36
 37 The items are designed to tap the dimensions of cosmopolitanism
 38 described by Merton, Appiah, and to some extent Jennings.²⁰ We were
 39 particularly sensitive to the need to write questions that would tap these
 40 dimensions that had nothing or very little to do with politics. We wanted
 41 the questions to seem politically benign so that the self-reports would
 42 be exogenous to political preferences and vote choice. This is why, for
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example, to tap into people's associations in their local community, we asked about playing softball on an organized team instead of whether they were members of the local Kiwanis Club. Similarly, in communities where hunting is popular, it is often done with family or friends from the local community. The travel items are designed to capture people's exposure to places and cultures different from their own. Finally, the food items are meant to gauge whether respondents do things (like eating foods) that reflect a cosmopolitan disposition or aspiration.

The focus on experience is important and drawn largely from the sociological work in the 1950s. More recently, Appiah²¹ explains why experience and behavior are more powerful than attitudes when it comes to increasing levels of cosmopolitanism:

I am a philosopher. I believe in Reason. But I have learned in a life of university teaching and research that even the cleverest people are not easily shifted by reason alone—and that can be true even in the most cerebral of realms. One of the great savants of the postwar era, John Von Neumann, liked to say, mischievously, that “in mathematics you don't understand things, you just get used to them.”²²

Appiah goes on to argue that “getting used to things”—including people different from yourself—takes time and practice. The exercise he uses to demonstrate this process is conversation, but imagine substituting any kind of behavioral experience for conversation, and you get the basic idea behind Appiah's claim. Conversation, he says, is a metaphor for engagement with the experience and the ideas of others:

Conversation, as I've said, is hardly guaranteed to lead to agreement about what to think and feel. Yet we go wrong if we think the point of conversation is to persuade, and imagine it proceeding as a debate. . . . Often enough, as Faust said, in the beginning is the deed: practices and not principles are what enable us to live together in peace. Conversation . . . doesn't have to lead to consensus about anything, especially not values; it's enough that it *helps people get used to one another* [emphasis added].²³

“Getting used to one another.” That is what happens as a by-product of daily life when people live or travel among others who are different. As much as possible, we try to capture this engagement, this experience, in our simple items. The travel and food items suppose differing underlying thresholds of cosmopolitanism in order to generate a positive, binary response. For example, we conjecture that it takes a higher level of cosmopolitanism to travel to South Africa than it does to travel to Canada from the United States. Similarly, even someone with a low level of cosmopolitanism might try Japanese food (or have the chance to go

1 to a Japanese restaurant), but this same person might think twice before
 2 going to an Indian restaurant. (curry is not as familiar to the American
 3 palate as teriyaki).

4 Finally, a word about why we chose to ask the questions retrospectively
 5 over a decade-long period. This represents an effort on our part
 6 to not have “one-off” cosmopolitan moments unduly contaminate our
 7 measure. We did not want to ask respondents whether they had “ever”
 8 eaten Indian or Japanese food: consider the respondent who tried sushi in
 9 a moment of youthful adventure, hated it (and perhaps many other “eth-
 10 nic” foods, too), but would nonetheless self-report the behavior that we
 11 would score as evidence of cosmopolitanism. Likewise, we did not want to
 12 count “one-off” trips to international destinations—perhaps taken many
 13 years ago, and perhaps not undertaken voluntarily, for members of the
 14 armed forces—as evidence of cosmopolitanism. On the other hand,
 15 making the time window for self-evaluation too short would skew the
 16 measures toward finding cosmopolitanism to be confined to the wealthy
 17 (or—dare we say—the professoriate). In this way, we were attempting to
 18 operationalize cosmopolitanism as a more or less enduring element of a
 19 person’s personality and lifestyle.
 20
 21

22 **Constructing a Cosmopolitanism Scale**

23
 24 In our preliminary analyses of these data, we repeatedly find the incidence
 25 of reporting cosmopolitan activities to increase with income. Figure 3-1
 26 shows the relationship between income and these incidence rates for the
 27 seven activities we consider here.

28 The overall incidence rates have a reassuring, superficial validity. For
 29 example, more registered voters have traveled to Canada or Mexico
 30 (about half) than have traveled to Europe or Australia (about a quarter).
 31 Similarly, in terms of ethnic foods, more of our registered voter sample
 32 report going to a Japanese restaurant than going to an Indian restaurant.
 33 Incidentally, these results are consistent with data from the U.S. Office of
 34 Travel and Tourism statistics on the locations to which Americans travel
 35 every year.

36 Just 1.1 percent of our respondents report engaging in all seven activi-
 37 ties; 18.1 percent of respondents report engaging in none of the seven
 38 listed activities. The incidence of engaging in none of these activities is
 39 strongly associated with income: 38 percent of respondents in the lowest
 40 income categories report engaging in none of the listed activities; this rate
 41 falls more or less monotonically as income rises, to be around 6 percent
 42 among respondents earning more than \$100,000 a year and about 2 per-
 43 cent when annual income rises above \$150,000. For all activities—except




Figure 3-1
Incidence of self-reports of cosmopolitanism/localism indicators, by income.

for the softball and hunting items—we see a moderate to strong association with income in figure 3-1. It would seem that income supplies some of the resources necessary to engage in cosmopolitan behaviors.

Table 3-1 presents the tetrachoric correlation matrix²⁴ R for the seven binary indicators (top seven rows of the table). The largest correlation is between the two food items (0.70), followed by some large correlations

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among the three travel items (0.67, 0.54, and 0.53). The softball and hunting items have a tetrachoric correlation of 0.40, and generally display small to moderate correlations with the other five items, although softball and travel to Asia, Africa, or South America correlate at 0.17. The correlations between the three travel and two food items average about 0.5. Interestingly, none of the correlations are negative (this is also true if we naïvely compute a Pearson correlation matrix with these binary items), suggesting the possibility of a method factor or “response set” in the data. (We defer a consideration of these methodological issues for another time.)

The eigenstructure of the tetrachoric correlation matrix indicates that multiple dimensions structure the responses to our seven items. There are two eigenvalues greater than unity, and while the first eigenvalue is reasonably large relative to the second (3.37 versus 1.27), it is not so large for us to comfortably ignore the possibility of multidimensionality. We fit a series of exploratory factor analytic models to the tetrachoric correlation matrix: with seven indicators, we can fit up to three factors.²⁵ A one-factor model sees a pattern of reasonably strong loadings (0.69 to 0.76) among the travel and food items and modest loadings from the softball and hunting items (0.36 and 0.21); these estimated loadings are reported in the bottom row of table 3-1.²⁶

In building a scale measure of cosmopolitanism, we draw on the results from the exploratory factor analysis. We conceive of and operationalize

Table 3-1. Tetrachoric Correlations among Binary Indicators of Cosmopolitanism, Eigenvalues, and Factor Loadings, September 2008 wave of CCAP.

	Softball	Hunting	E/A	C/M	A/A/SA	Indian	Japanese
Hunting	.40						
Europe/Australia	.18	.05					
Canada/Mexico	.32	.22	.55				
Asia/Africa/South America	.17	.12	.67	.53			
Indian food	.25	.11	.54	.49	.50		
Japanese food	.35	.22	.51	.49	.46	.70	
Eigenvalues	3.39	1.27	.70	.57	.46	.32	.29
Factor loadings	.36	.21	.76	.69	.72	.76	.75

Note: $n = 14,942$ complete cases; 15,272 partially observed cases. The lower triangle of the tetrachoric correlation matrix R appears in the top seven rows of the table, above the seven eigenvalues of R . The lower row reports maximum likelihood estimates of the loadings from a one-factor factor analysis of R .

Table 3-2. Item Parameter Estimates, Five Indicators of Cosmopolitanism, September 2008 Wave of CCAP

	Discrimination	StdDev	Difficulty	StdDev
Europe/Australia	0.93	0.03	0.81	0.02
Canada/Mexico	0.68	0.02	-0.21	0.01
Asia/Africa/ South America	0.92	0.03	1.49	0.03
Indian food	0.91	0.03	0.30	0.02
Japanese food	0.87	0.02	-0.74	0.02

Note: $n = 15,272$ partially observed cases. Cell entries are MCMC-generated estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the marginal posterior density of each item’s discrimination and difficulty parameters.

cosmopolitanism as a unidimensional construct. The softball and hunting items—which we conjectured would measure an “anti-cosmopolitanism” or “localism”—appear to load on a separate dimension, and, if anything, load weakly but positively when we impose unidimensionality on the seven items. So as to bolster the validity of our recovered dimension, we exclude these two anomalous items from the actual scaling. We fit the remaining five items using an item-response theory (IRT) model, identical to that used in the analysis of educational testing data and binary roll call data.²⁷ In this IRT model, we treat each subject’s score on the latent cosmopolitanism dimension as a parameter to be estimated; we impose the identifying normalization that the scores on the latent dimension have mean zero and variance one across the respondents. Estimates of the item parameters are reported in table 3-2; the discrimination parameters are largely identical to one another, save for the slightly smaller discrimination of the Canada/Mexico travel item.

Correlates of Cosmopolitanism

Like many other enduring traits, we believe that cosmopolitanism is learned or experienced initially at an early age. In this view, children acquire tendencies toward cosmopolitanism along with other values that are normative from their social environment. Social pressure, as well as “the intrinsic strength of early learned attitudes” promotes the persistence of values like cosmopolitanism “through the vicissitudes of later life.”²⁸ In this way, cosmopolitanism may be correlated with political attitudes of interest and other politically relevant variables.

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1 We suspect that income and education are positively associated with
2 cosmopolitanism; both increase resources and opportunities to experi-
3 ence different people and cultures. Religious affiliation and religiosity
4 may also shape cosmopolitan orientations, as some doctrines are more
5 parochial than others. The desire to experience new things may also be
6 related to cosmopolitanism; we include traditional measures of personal-
7 ity to capture these tendencies. Finally, cosmopolitanism may be corre-
8 lated with political attitudes such as attitudes about race, immigration,
9 the war in Iraq, health care, and gun control.

10 We model the cosmopolitanism index using these predictors and a
11 host of other controls (gender, age, ideology, marital status, partisanship).
12 Finally, to account for the role that opportunity might play in increasing
13 levels of cosmopolitanism, we also measure the urbanity of the respon-
14 dent's residential locale, with the percentage of the households in the
15 respondent's zip code that are deemed "urban."²⁹

16 Summaries of the relationships between cosmopolitanism and these
17 correlates appear in table 3-3. Each line of the table represents the results
18 of a separate regression in which our cosmopolitanism measure is the de-
19 pendent variable. Age, symbolic racism, and openness to experience enter
20 their respective regressions as continuous variables and are modeled with
21 thin-plate smoothing splines, while all other predictors enter their respec-
22 tive regressions as a series of mutually exhaustive and exclusive dummy
23 variables (one for each unique level of the predictor).

24 Income and education are important drivers of cosmopolitanism, ac-
25 counting for 27 percent and 22 percent of the variation in cosmopoli-
26 tanism, respectively. We have already noted that the rates of reporting
27 behaviors that are indicators of cosmopolitanism increase in income (fig-
28 ure 3-1); unsurprisingly, we find a monotonically increasing pattern be-
29 tween our scale measure of cosmopolitanism and income. Similarly, we
30 find cosmopolitanism to generally increase with educational attainment,
31 with over a standard deviation separating median levels of cosmopolitan-
32 ism across the five categories of educational attainment we utilize (less
33 than high school through to post-graduate degrees).

34 Other important predictors of cosmopolitanism include racial resent-
35 ment, urbanity of the respondent's locale (zip code), and openness to ex-
36 perience. We operationalize the latter concepts using a dimension of the
37 personality battery commonly referred to as the "Big 5."³⁰ High scores on
38 this particular dimension of the five-factor personality model are associ-
39 ated with intellectual curiosity, openness to emotion, interest in art, and a
40 willingness to try new things. The trait is said to distinguish imaginative
41 people from down-to-earth conventional people. Lower scores on this
42 dimension are associated with conventional traditional interests. Low
43 scores indicate a preference for the obvious over the complex and the

Table 3-3. Correlates of Cosmopolitanism

Variable	<i>r</i> ²	<i>F</i>	<i>df</i> ₁	<i>df</i> ₂	<i>p</i> -value
<i>Demographics</i>					
Marital status	.01	21.8	6	15,265	<.01
Education	.22	843.3	5	15,266	<.01
Income	.27	569.0	4.6	13,885.4	<.01
Religion	.04	52.9	13	15,258	<.01
Race	.02	35.7	7	15,264	<.01
Gender	.02	297.5	1	15,270	<.01
Age	.07	41.8	2.5	15,265.5	<.01
<i>Geography</i>					
Percent urban (zip)	.11	103.3	7	14,620	<.01
State	.06	2.5	50	15,221	<.01
Battleground	.01	111.9	1	15,270	<.01
<i>Attitudes</i>					
Party ID	.02	35.8	9	15,262	<.01
Ideology	.08	25.6	5	15,100	<.01
Racial resentment (September)	.11	91.4	8.3	15,088.7	<.01
Openness to experience	.07	185.7	6	14,920	<.01
<i>Issues</i>					
Border fence	.07	177.9	6	14,372	<.01
Arrest immigrants	.04	228.9	3	15,268	<.01
Handgun ban	.02	48.6	6	14,372	<.01
Iraq withdraw	.02	53.8	5	15,266	<.01

Note: Each line represents a separate regression analysis. The relationship between cosmopolitanism and continuous predictors (income, age, percent urban in zip and racial resentment) are fit non parametrically, via thin-plate smoothing splines.

familiar over the novel. In our model of cosmopolitanism, this relationship comes through plainly. There is a strong positive association between increasing levels of openness and cosmopolitanism.

We see a relationship between geography and cosmopolitanism, with state of residence accounting for 6 percent of the variation in cosmopolitanism, while urbanity of the respondent's zip code accounts for 11 percent of the variation. This is not unexpected. Living in a more urban area may bring more opportunity to engage in the cosmopolitan behaviors we ask about. The Census Bureau defines addresses as urban if they are located within an extended Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Roughly

1 10 percent of our sample live in entirely rural areas (zip codes that are en-
2 tirely nonurban) and slightly more than 30 percent live in zip codes that
3 are entirely urban areas. The more fine-grained indicator of spatial set-
4 ting—urbanity at the zip code level—accounts for almost twice as much
5 variation in cosmopolitanism as state of residence.

6 We measure attitudes about race with the notion of symbolic racism,³¹
7 operationalized with the racial resentment scale.³² Instead of explicitly
8 asking about overt racial prejudice, this scale (constructed from a four-
9 item battery) taps prejudice cloaked as a legitimate disapproval and an-
10 tipathy toward violations of traditional American norms of hard work,
11 self-reliance, and equality of opportunity.³³ Increasing levels of resent-
12 ment toward African Americans as expressed through symbolic racism
13 are negatively related to cosmopolitanism, as we expected. The nonpara-
14 metric fit of racial resentment to cosmopolitanism results in an r^2 of 0.11,
15 making racial resentment one of the better predictors of cosmopolitanism
16 we consider here. Figure 3-2 shows the relationship between the two vari-
17 ables, with a distinct drop in cosmopolitanism (vertical axis) occurring
18 close to the middle of the racial resentment scale; respondents scoring
19 high on racial resentment tend to be somewhat less cosmopolitan than
20 respondents exhibiting low levels of racial resentment.

21 We also examine the association between cosmopolitanism and stances
22 on issues relevant to the 2008 election. These issues include whether ille-
23 gal immigrants should be arrested and deported, restrictions on handgun
24 sales, and whether the United States should build a fence along the border
25 with Mexico.³⁴ The immigration items correlate with cosmopolitanism
26 as one might expect: those who want to take measures to keep illegal
27 immigrants out of America are less likely to be cosmopolitan. Yet over-
28 all, none of these issues explain much variation in cosmopolitanism, and
29 certainly do not rival education or income as predictors. These issues tap
30 the facet of cosmopolitanism that Appiah³⁵ describes as ethical standards
31 in a “world of strangers.” Here, we find that having little tolerance for
32 those “strangers” is negatively associated with the likelihood of visiting
33 their countries or restaurants. In this way, we see that cosmopolitanism
34 is not just related to any political issue, but specifically to those having
35 to do with “others” or “strangers.” On the other hand, ideological self-
36 placement on a five-point scale (“very liberal” to “very conservative” plus
37 a “not sure” outcome) accounts for more variation in cosmopolitanism
38 (8 percent) than any particular issue; unsurprisingly, conservatives are
39 less cosmopolitan than liberals, with those being “not sure” being espe-
40 cially noncosmopolitan (a median score one standard deviation below
41 the mean). Stances on issues such as when the United States should with-
42 draw from Iraq and whether to ban handguns explain virtually none of
43 the variation in cosmopolitanism.




Figure 3-2

Cosmopolitanism, by racial resentment (measured contemporaneously in the September 2008 wave of CCAP). The solid line is a nonparametric fit (a thin-plate smoothing spline).

When we combine all of the preceding items in a multiple regression analysis—again with the continuous predictors entering nonparametrically—we explain about one-half of the variation in cosmopolitanism. The strongest correlates remain those described earlier: income, education, racial resentment, and the urbanity of zip code measure. We turn now to a brief elaboration of the geographic component of cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitanism and Geography

We further explore the geographic basis of cosmopolitanism in figure 3-3, plotting state-level average levels of cosmopolitanism. We limit the analysis of geography to states in which we have more than 75 respondents.³⁶ The most cosmopolitan states in the nation—at least as represented by the registered voters sample used by CCAP—are Virginia, Nevada, California,

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


Figure 3-3
Cosmopolitanism, medians, and 10th and 90th percentiles, by state.

and Massachusetts, closely followed by Arizona, New Mexico, and Washington. The most locally oriented states are Arkansas, West Virginia, Iowa, and Missouri. While it looks like Southern states are populated with locals and non-Southern states with cosmopolites, consider that Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina are all in or above the middle of the list. This said, we note that the within-state variation in cosmopolitanism is very large relative to the between-state variation; recall that in table 3-3, we find that state of residence accounts for just 6 percent of the variation in cosmopolitanism.

We observe a slightly stronger relationship between urbanity of the zip code and cosmopolitanism. In table 3-3, we report that 11 percent of the variation in cosmopolitanism is due to this urbanity, almost double the variation accounted for by state of residence. Moreover, the relationship is nonlinear, with average levels of cosmopolitanism increasing by about half a standard deviation (from -0.5 to 0) as urbanity of zip code increases from about 60 percent to 100 percent. Urban life would certainly provide more opportunities for cosmopolitan activities, at least as we have defined them here. Nonetheless, “opportunity” does not seem to be a sufficient condition for cosmopolitanism, with substantial within-unit variation in cosmopolitanism at either the state or zip code level.

We turn now to an investigation of whether our operationalization of cosmopolitanism predicts vote choice in the Democratic primary and the general election, and specifically whether cosmopolitanism has unique effects on vote choice that are not captured by typical predictors of these choices.

Cosmopolitanism in the Campaign for the Democratic Presidential Nomination

We consider the dichotomous choice between Clinton and Obama in the Democratic primary. We began this project believing that many Americans viewed Barack Obama as different—not just because of his race, but because of his connection to a broader world and his global sensibilities. We suspect that increasing levels of cosmopolitanism should be related to increasing probabilities of voting for Obama in both the Democratic primary and the general election. In order to assess this relationship, we use logistic regression of the binary vote choice (Obama versus Clinton), including measures of symbolic racism (our scaling of the racial resentment items), income, party identification, education, gender, age (entering the model nonparametrically), and urbanity in the respondent’s zip code as determinants of the choice between Obama and Clinton.

We estimate the model at four points in time: December, January, March, and September,³⁷ restricting the analysis to white voters. What is driving Democratic vote choice between Obama and Clinton for these voters? As we and others have demonstrated³⁸ racial resentment plays an important and robust role in the choice between Obama and Clinton. But gender and age matter, too.

We present a selection of the logistic regression estimates in table 3-4. The racial resentment effects and the gender offsets are not surprising. Unreported here, we also find that younger voters are more likely to vote for Obama than Clinton, all else equal. Clinton appears to fare better with the Democratic “base” than Obama, while Obama has more appeal to independents and Republican identifiers voting in the Democratic primaries.³⁹ The goodness-of-fit measures—the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC curve)—indicate that the models fit the data reasonably well.

Amid controls for various demographics, ideology, and even racial resentment, cosmopolitanism is a predictor of Obama vote in the Democratic primary, at least in the early going. The effects of cosmopolitanism wane over the course of the prolonged campaign for the Democratic nomination, and are not distinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance by September 2008. We compute the predicted effect of a two standard deviation change in cosmopolitanism on the probability of a report of a Obama vote (versus a vote for Clinton) in the Democratic primaries and caucuses, holding other predictors constant (see table 3-5). The change associated with a two standard deviation difference in cosmopolitanism is quite large in the early stages of the primary campaign, equivalent to a 10 percentage point swing in vote share among

Table 3-4. Cosmopolitanism and Obama-Clinton Primary Vote, 2007–2008, Logistic Regression Analysis, White Voters Only Who Prefer Either Obama (1) or Clinton (0)

	December		January		March		September	
	Est.	SE	Est.	SE	Est.	SE	Est.	SE
Cosmopolitanism	.30	.07	.22	.07	.09	.05	.05	.05
Racial resentment	-.59	.07	-.75	.07	-.75	.05	-.62	.05
Female	-.32	.12	-.52	.11	-.58	.08	-.41	.08
Area under ROC curve	.75		.76		.74		.71	
<i>n</i>	1,895		2,146		3,531		3,575	

Note: Models also include party identification, income, education, percent urban in respondent, zip code, and a smoothing spline over respondent age.

Table 3-5. Changes in Probability of Obama Primary Vote (over Clinton) in Response to a Two Standard Deviation Change in Cosmopolitanism

	Local (-1 SD)	Orientation	
		Cosmopolitan (+1 SD)	Change
December	.29	.43	.14
January	.44	.55	.11
March	.50	.55	.05
September	.44	.47	.02

Note: Predictions based on modeling reported in table 3-4. Continuous predictors held constant at their means; party identification set to Independent, education set to Some College, and gender set to Male.

otherwise reasonably typical looking primary voters. But by the March 2008 wave of CCAP, when the controversy over Obama’s ties to Reverend Wright was raging, the effects of cosmopolitanism are dwarfed by racial resentment and gender.

That is, cosmopolitanism is related to initial preferences over Obama and Clinton as evidenced by its large effects in the early waves of the study, even as we control for income, education, racial resentment, and other things driving this choice. As the campaign wears on and information is revealed (and the dynamics of momentum begin to take shape), the effect of cosmopolitanism diminishes. Voters whose experiences take them beyond their local boundaries were more likely to vote for Obama than for Clinton in the Democratic contest. As primary voters evaluated whether it was reasonable to vote for a black man named Barack Hussein Obama, who had a Kenyan father and grew up all over the world, they drew upon their beliefs about that world—in Appiah’s terms, cosmopolitan voters were “used to” someone like Obama already. Perhaps not directly, but people with cosmopolitan leanings were in “conversation” with strangers like Obama their whole lives, or at least a good portion of their lives, and that is what makes voting for him easier than it is for Democrats with more local orientations.

Support for Obama and Cosmopolitanism

We have claimed that cosmopolitanism has a distinctive role in shaping support for Obama. If this is correct, then we should see that cosmopolitanism is more strongly related to support for Obama than for

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other candidates. To examine this, we model support for candidates in the Democratic primary with a series of binary logistic models, repeating the specification used in the Obama-versus-Clinton analysis, earlier.

The goal of this analysis is to isolate cosmopolitanism as an important factor in the choices involving Obama and not in the other choices. For example, if cosmopolitanism really is primed in this election because of Obama's presence, it should matter (or matter more) when the choice is one with Obama in it compared to a choice without Obama in it. We expect cosmopolitanism to have an effect in the Obama-Clinton and Obama-Edwards evaluations, for example. If it really taps into the dimensions we think it does, cosmopolitanism should not matter much for choices between Clinton and Edwards, or Clinton and the remainder of the field. Cosmopolitanism should matter for the choice between Obama and Clinton, Obama and Edwards, and Obama and the rest of the field. We present these results for the four primary election waves of the survey in table 3-6.

Table 3-6. Cosmopolitanism and Democratic Primary Matchups

	December		January		March		September	
	Est	SE	Est	SE	Est	SE	Est	SE
Obama versus Clinton								
Cosmopolitanism	.30	.07	.22	.07	.09	.05	.05	.05
Racial resentment	-.59	.07	-.75	.07	-.75	.05	-.62	.05
Obama versus Edwards								
Cosmopolitanism	.24	.08	.16	.07	-.01	.09	.08	.08
Racial resentment	-.16	.07	-.17	.07	-.30	.09	-.14	.08
Obama versus Other								
Cosmopolitanism	.20	.09	.11	.13	.13	.12	.03	.10
Racial resentment	-.08	.09	-.07	.13	-.32	.13	-.16	.10
Edwards versus Clinton								
Cosmopolitanism	.03	.07	.04	.07	.11	.09	-.00	.08
Racial resentment	-.47	.06	-.62	.07	-.50	.09	-.51	.08
Clinton versus Other								
Cosmopolitanism	-.08	.09	-.13	.14	-.01	.12	.01	.10
Racial resentment	.55	.09	.65	.14	.50	.13	.53	.10

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients for white voters. Obama is always the "1" outcome if he is in the matchup. Edwards and Other are the "1" in their pairings with Clinton. Coefficients on other covariates are suppressed; see text for details of full specification.

In table 3-6, we present logit coefficients for the two covariates in which we are most interested: cosmopolitanism and racial resentment. Each column of the table represents a different wave of the survey, starting with the December 2007 baseline wave. The first three rows contain the choices in which Obama is a candidate. An examination of the coefficients on cosmopolitanism in the first three rows compared to the bottom two rows reveals the pattern we expect to find. Cosmopolitanism is a significant predictor for matchups including Obama, but for matchups without Obama, we cannot be sure that the effects of cosmopolitanism are different from zero. The effects in December and January, for example, translate into greater than 10 points in increased support for Obama as cosmopolitanism moves a standard deviation in each direction, regardless of whether the opposing candidate is Clinton or Edwards. But, in a matchup between Edwards and Clinton (row 4), the role of cosmopolitanism is nowhere near as clear and indeed, we cannot be sure it has any effect at all. In short, unless Obama is in the matchup, cosmopolitanism does not matter.

On the other hand, the fact that symbolic racism—operationalized here as racial resentment—continues to matter a great deal when Obama is not in the matchup is not at all surprising. The predictive power of racial resentment does not turn on the presence of a black candidate in the choice set, and this fact has been well known to students of American public opinion for some time.⁴⁰

Preferences in the General Election

How does cosmopolitanism fare in the general election contest between Obama and his Republican opponent John McCain? In the presence of strong predictors like partisanship, ideology, withdrawal from Iraq, health insurance, and a host of other controls, does cosmopolitanism add any predictive or explanatory power to the model? The answer is yes—cosmopolitan still plays a vital role in choices about Obama, even in the general election contest.

We consider a reasonably simple model of general election vote choice between Obama and McCain in the baseline, December 2007, and post-election waves of CCAP (see table 3-7). In December of 2007, roughly 2,000 randomly selected respondents were asked to express a preference for either McCain or Obama—even though it was not expected that either one of them would be their party nominee.⁴¹ We compare the structure of vote choice between these two candidates in December to the structure one year later in November of 2008. Predictors in the model include cosmopolitanism, racial resentment, retrospective assessments of

Table 3-7. Cosmopolitanism and Two-Party General Election Vote Choice, December 2007, and Post-Election Waves

	December 2007		November 2008	
	Est.	SE	Est.	SE
Intercept	-.82	.26	-1.32	.23
Cosmopolitanism	-.03	.08	.16	.05
Racial resentment	-.77	.09	-1.06	.06
Negative economic retrospections	.48	.16	.89	.20
Liberal	.47	.18	.99	.16
Conservative	-.44	.18	-.65	.12
Education > high school	.11	.16	.05	.11
Male	-.18	.14	.28	.09
Under 45	.30	.14	.36	.10
Democrat	.98	.19	1.77	.12
Republican	-.92	.22	-2.03	.12
Arrest/deport illegal immigrants	-.36	.15	-.58	.10
Leave Iraq now	.90	.16	1.04	.13
Government provide health insurance	.43	.15	1.10	.11
Ban handguns	.09	.16	.45	.10
Area under ROC curve	.92		.97	
<i>n</i>	2,295		9,932	

Note: Logit coefficients, white voters only. Dependent variable is vote report for Obama (1) versus McCain (0).

the economy, indicators of ideological self-position, educational attainment, age, party identification, and stances on a number of issues.

Party, ideology, and respondents' positions on issues all behave as we would expect. Increasing levels of symbolic racism are a strong predictor of vote against Obama even in the baseline, December 2007, wave of the survey. Cosmopolitanism, however, has more of a dynamic story. In December 2007, before people knew that Obama would be a focal candidate in the general election race, cosmopolitanism plays no role in the choice between he and McCain. Over the course of the campaign—and indeed by late January after he emerges as the candidate most likely to defeat Clinton—cosmopolitanism starts to play an important role. Our estimate is that for an otherwise indifferent voter, a one standard devia-

tion would result in a 4 point change in the probability of voting for Obama in the general election, holding the other variables in the model constant.

Once again, we see that cosmopolitanism demonstrates two important features: (1) cosmopolitanism is a predictor of political choices even controlling for many other important and strong determinants of vote choice, and (2) cosmopolitanism is systematically related to vote for or against the most unusual presidential candidate America has recently seen.

Conclusion

We set out to test whether cultural, social, and experiential differences among Americans—indicators of cosmopolitanism—account for any of the variation in vote share in the 2008 Democratic primary and general election. Our conjecture was that Obama was thought of as different because of more than just his race. The way the candidates campaigned and where they were while they were campaigning, especially in the last weeks of the primary, led us to the notion of cosmopolitanism. If there were social and cultural differences separate from attitudes about Obama's race, could we uncover them through a set of questions aimed at illustrating Americans' local or cosmopolitan orientations toward the world?

Our preliminary exploration of cosmopolitanism has proven fruitful. We cannot claim to have measured the concept flawlessly. Rather, our aim has been to stake a claim for the concept, to show that cosmopolitanism has predictive power. Our analysis highlights that Obama had to first be identified as a viable candidate for cosmopolitanism to become important. Our investigation has also shown that cosmopolitanism is not the same as geography or the political and social attitudes we already measure. And even in the presence of the strong Obama vote predictor—symbolic racism—cosmopolitanism has a large and unique effect on vote choice.

The steady pattern of cosmopolitan's influence throughout the 2008 cycle suggests a new dimension in the study of race, ethnicity, and politics. Globalization is changing the political landscape, both in terms of the issues facing contemporary democracies and the candidates who run for office. In 2008, for the first time, a major American party made a man who was not white their presidential nomination. And the person who gave him the toughest challenge for the nomination was a woman. After President Obama's first State of the Union speech, the opposition party's counterargument was given by the governor of Louisiana, a young man of Indian descent, Piyush Amrit Jindal, who goes by "Bobby." The face of politics in America is changing, and to understand how voters are

1 reacting to these changes, we may need to move beyond conceptions of
2 prejudice that are literally black and white.

4 **Appendix: Question Wordings**

6 *Racial Resentment*

7 Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following state-
8 ments:

9
10 Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions
11 that make it difficult for African Americans to work their way out
12 of the lower class.

13 Many other minority groups have overcome prejudice and worked
14 their way up. African Americans should do the same without any
15 special favors.

16 Over the past few years, African Americans have gotten less than they
17 deserve.

18 It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if African
19 Americans would only try harder, they could be just as well off as
20 whites.

21
22 Outcome categories: Agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree
23 nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly.

24 *Immigration*

25 Which comes closest to your view about illegal immigration?

26 Illegal immigrants should be arrested and deported.

27 Illegal immigrants now living in the United States should be allowed to
28 become citizens if they pay a fine.

29 I'm not sure; I haven't thought much about this.

30 *Iraq*

31 How long should the United States stay in Iraq?

32 Should leave immediately.

33 Should leave within one year.

34 Should stay for at least another year but not indefinitely.

Should stay in Iraq as long as it takes to stabilize the country.
I'm not sure; I haven't thought much about this.

Border Fence

Tell us how much you agree with the following policy:

Building a 700-mile fence along U.S. border.

Outcome categories: Strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree, don't know.

Health Care

Which comes closest to your view about providing health care in the United States?

The government should provide everyone with health care and pay for it with tax dollars.

Companies should be required to provide health insurance for their employees, and the government should provide subsidies for those who are not working or retired.

Health insurance should be voluntary. Individuals should either buy insurance or obtain it through their employers as they do currently.

The elderly and the very poor should be covered by Medicare and Medicaid as they are currently.

I'm not sure; I haven't thought much about this.

Personality—Ten-Item Personality Index (TIPI)

Here are a number of personality traits that may apply to you. Please rate the extent to which you agree that the pair of traits apply to you, even if one applies more strongly than the other:

Extraverted, enthusiastic.

Critical, quarrelsome.

Dependable, self-disciplined.

Anxious, easily upset.

Open to new experiences, complex.

Reserved, quiet.

Sympathetic, warm.

1 Disorganized, careless.
 2 Calm, emotionally stable.
 3 Conventional, uncreative.

4 Outcome categories: Disagree strongly, disagree moderately, disagree
 5 a little, neither agree nor disagree, agree a little, agree moderately, agree
 6 strongly.
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 8

9 Notes

10 We thank David Sears, Michael Tesler, and Brian Law for helpful discussions and
 11 comments on this work. We are grateful to David Barker and his colleagues at
 12 Pittsburgh, along with participants in the CCAP Lake Arrowhead Research Meet-
 13 ing for providing challenging questions and reactions that helped us strengthen
 14 and clarify the argument. We owe special thanks to Paul Sniderman for recognizing
 15 this work as interesting and inviting us to participate in this volume.

16 1. For example, this interview with *USA Today* from early May 2008.

17 2. Audio and a transcript of Obama's remarks were posted to Huffington Post
 18 and were quickly replayed and/or reported in the mainstream media.

19 3. Merton (1947).

20 4. Merton (1957).

21 5. Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955).

22 6. Gouldner (1957, 1958).

23 7. Abrahamson (1965).

24 8. Filley and Grimes (1968).

25 9. Jennings (1967).

26 10. Appiah (2006).

27 11. For example, Walzer (2006).

28 12. Merton (1957).

29 13. Appiah (2006).

30 14. Jackman and Vavreck (2010a).

31 15. Appiah (2006), p. xv.

32 16. Jackman and Vavreck (2009).

33 17. Vavreck and Rivers (2008).

34 18. Jackman and Vavreck (2010).

35 19. The Common Content portion of CCAP is the first 10 minutes of every
 36 respondent's survey. The total length of the survey is 20 minutes. After the com-
 37 mon part of the survey, respondents are routed to any one of the many team stud-
 38 ies, which make up the second half of the survey. For details on the mechanics
 39 of how this works and information about how panelists are recruited into the
 40 PollingPoint panel, see Vavreck and Rivers (2008).

41 20. Merton (1957); Appiah (2006); Jennings (1967).

42 21. Appiah (2006).

43 22. *Ibid.*, p. 84

23. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

24. The tetrachoric correlation between two binary variables y_j , $j = 1, 2$, is the correlation between their latent counterparts, y_j^* , where $y_j = 1 \Leftrightarrow y_j^* > 0$ and $y_j = 0$ otherwise, and the y_j^* have a bivariate normal density with mean zero, unit variances and tetrachoric covariance/correlation r .

25. Each model is fit via the maximum likelihood factor analysis function `factanal` in R.

26. Going up to two factors sees the travel and food items separate, with the softball and hunting items loading modestly on the food factor (after a conventional varimax rotation of the estimated factor structure). The (nearly saturated) three-factor model results in quite distinct travel, food, and softball/hunting factors. Goodness of fit statistics suggest a modest improvement in going from a one- to a two-dimensional model, with the RMSE (root mean squared error) falling from 0.10 to 0.07; the nearly saturated three-factor model has RMSE of 0.01, consistent with overfitting the data.

27. Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004).

28. Kinder and Sears (1981).

29. This proportion is generated with data from the 2000 U.S. Census by dividing the number of households in each zip code that are within an urban metropolitan statistical area by the total number of households in the zip code. The proportion ranges from zero to one, with a mean value of 0.78 and a standard deviation of 0.32.

30. The “Big 5” are five broad dimensions of personality developed by L. R. Goldberg in 1992 through lexical analysis. The traits are openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (OCEAN). For a list of the questions used to generate the openness dimension used here, please see the appendix.

31. Kinder and Sears (1981).

32. Kinder and Sanders (1996).

33. See the question wordings in the appendix, or see our detailed analysis of how symbolic racism predicts the vote for Obama in the general and primary elections in Jackman and Vavreck (2010b). Here we construct a racial resentment score via factor analysis.

34. Exact question wordings appear in the appendix.

35. Appiah (2006).

36. This eliminates eleven states: Alaska, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.

37. The December wave is a vote intention for everyone, and the September wave is a vote report for everyone. In the January wave, only people in Iowa, New Hampshire, Michigan, South Carolina, Nevada, and Florida had voted. By the March wave, nearly everyone had voted, but most notably, not people in Indiana, Kentucky, or Pennsylvania.

38. Tesler and Sears (2010); Jackman and Vavreck (2010a).

39. Jackman and Vavreck (2010a).

40. For example, Tesler and Sears (2010).

1 41. Respondents in our December 2007 wave were fielded three randomly
2 chosen of twelve possible matchups between three Democratic contenders (Clin-
3 ton, Edwards, and Obama) and four Republican contenders (Giuliani, Huckabee,
4 McCain, and Romney), with one exception: the Clinton-Giuliani matchup seemed
5 likely to eventuate in late 2007, and all of our December 2007 respondents were
6 fielded this particular matchup.
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